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Abstract
We study changes in Twitter users’ behavior
associated with interacting with automated bots on
the platform. Based on the list of malicious bots
identified and shut down by Twitter in the wake of
2016 US presidential election, we are able to identify
about 54 thousand human Twitter users who have
interacted with automated accounts. We first establish
the baseline pattern of user behavior in the period
before interaction and then measure behavioral changes
observed around the period of interaction. Using
a quasi-experimental research design, we document
economically and statistically significant quantitative
and qualitative changes in users’ behavior and discuss
their implications.
1. Introduction
The proliferation of online social networks (e.g.
Facebook, Twitter, etc.) has created significant
challenges for modern societies. One of them is the
easiness of implementing automated accounts (hereafter
bots) who could pedal certain type of content through
the network without regard for the veracity of this
content. Bots on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube
have been explicitly linked to disinformation campaigns
during the run-up to 2016 US presidential elections
[1, 2], as well as in other digitally-intensive political
processes outside the United States [3, 4]. Even
though a part of research community questions whether
bot activities have changed the outcome of the 2016
US elections [5], the fact that they contribute to a
larger problem of spread of fake news, low-credibility
and inflammatory content is without a doubt [6, 7,
8]. The scale of inflicted damage of such activities
could reach devastating proportions even for established
democracies [9, 10].
Yet, not much is know about who interacts with bots
and how (if at all) this interaction alters their behavior
on social networks themselves. Do these people increase
their engagement on the platform (i.e. social network) as
a result of interaction? Is this increase long-lasting? Are
they able to generate more engaging content? Current
paper attempts to answer these questions by using an
extensive data set of Twitter users who have interacted
with a recognized bot. A list of 2,752 malicious bots that
were shut down by the platform was forwarded to the
United States congress and made public in November
2017. We have identified the 50 most influential bots
from this list. We have further identified a large portion
of Twitter users who have interacted with these bots.
In this paper we study the subset of Twitter users who
have interacted at least once with one of these 50
most influential bots. We show that such interaction
is associated with quantitative, as well as qualitative
changes in twitter user behavior. Interestingly, our
results indicate that these changes start significantly
before the first official interaction with the identified bot.
2. Decisions before and after interacting
with the bot
2016 US presidential election has put the spotlight
on electronic social networks and the role they play in
modern society. Electronic social networks facilitate
maintenance of social relationships, but they also
assume the role of an information broker [11]. The
attachment of the latter function to electronic social
networks might, however, be problematic as they are
designed to prioritize engaging rather than trustworthy
content [8]. Significant effort toward counteracting
consequences of such design have come from major
social networks over the past five years. However, these
are in a direct clash with business models of electronic
social networks and, thus, can go only so far.
With the rise of artificial intelligence, the automation
of human-computer interaction has also become
popular. Specific “conversational bots” have been
developed and successfully applied in multiple
settings ranging from medical [12] to human resource
management [13] applications. Such has also penetrated





social networks with the development of “social
bots”. However, their purpose and aim, as well as
consequences stand currently questioned [14]. This is
particularly problematic as social networks are infested
with bots that are masked under the guise of humans
[15, 7] and can employ sophisticated strategies to sway
public opinion [16]. On top of this, given adaptation
capabilities of such automated agents, the coincidence
between the bot design purpose and ultimate outcome
cannot be guaranteed [17].
Given an important potential for impacting
information circulation and human decision process,
the actual impact of social bots is currently questioned.
While one part of research community reports on high
efficiency of automated agents on social networks
[6, 7, 18], the other set of authors questions the size
of such impact. For example, [19] demonstrates that
bots are significantly less central than verified accounts
during the discussions around contentious political
events, and [20] reports that only a small proportion
of vaccine-critical information that reaches active
US Twitter users comes from bots. Overall findings
indicate that public’s trust in social bots, and therefore
the potential for the impact on their decision-making
process, depends on the area of inquiry [21].
Under such circumstances, from the individual
decision-making perspective, it is important to ask two
questions: Why do people interact with bots? And does
this interaction change their behavior?
Even though the empirical part of the paper
concentrates on the latter question, it is worth
mentioning that when contemplating the former
question the fact whether you know that the interaction
counter-part is a bot or not is an important variable.
Besides potential concealment of bot identity, social
network users might get exposed to bots due to their
friends’ choices. Given that trust levels are high
among close social contacts [22], information streaming
through this medium might also enjoy high trust [23].
Through this mechanism, bots may be able to affect
structure and functioning of social systems.
Even if the account is identified as a bot, the
user might decide to engage with such automated
entity. As postulated by the theory of embodied
cognition, the presence of (ro)bots in a social system
affects the way humans perceive social norms [24].
Research in Computers as Social Actors initiated by
[25] has demonstrated particular ease with which
humans anthropomorphise computer artifacts. Thus,
bots could readily be accepted as parts of the social
system. Known presence of bots in the system could
make the interaction (even if confrontational) with bots
more acceptable [26]. Research studying differences
in interaction patterns across human-to-human and
human-to-bot interactions reveals striking similarities
across the two setups [27] indicating particular ease in
treating automated agents similar to human users.
Somewhat more importantly for evaluating the
impact of automated agents, human decision-making
might be altered as a result of interacting with bots.
Emotional contagion theory argues that human to human
interaction can be a medium for emotional transfer [28].
Through a longitudinal study, [29] have shown that this
process can result in a large scale diffusion emotion
diffusion process. Further, [9] have demonstrated that
such emotional contagion can happen on electronic
social networks too (on Facebook in this case). A
different stream of research has demonstrated that
talking to chatbots can change human motivations [30].
Given this potential, and theoretical studies indicating
high potential impact of such changes [31], behavioral
changes associated with interaction with social bots is
worthy of our attention.
3. Data
Our data collection has started by distilling the list
of 2,752 bots down to a more manageable set. The task
consisted of identifying the most influential automated
accounts. Given that all these accounts are now defunct,
we could not collect detailed data on their behavior.
However, traces of all accounts remain in posts of
currently functional accounts. As a first step we have
extracted all data on all 2,752 bots available on the
platform as of September 2020. In order to measure
the respectfulness of the bot we counted the number
of verified accounts that have interacted with each of
the bots. 50 bots that command the highest number
of verified accounts mentioning them in the posts were
retained for the analysis. Table 1 gives presents the
list of the bots retained for the analysis. This list
contains some famous bots impersonating organizations
and individuals from both ends of the political spectrum,
like @ten gop (and its variants) which is supposed to
be the account of the Tennessee Republican Party and
was an integral part of the Muller investigation, and
@crystal1johnson who was supposed to be a “black
lives matter activist” who became famous by the fact
that Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey retweeted some of its
content.
The next step consisted of identifying all Twitter
users who were recorded as having interacted with
one of the 50 most influential bots. In this work
interaction counts as a voluntary communication (i.e.,
writing a post, or commenting somebody else’s post)
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Table 1. Automated accounts (bots) included in the
analysis.
order not to confound the effects of interacting with
multiple bots, we have excluded all users who have
interacted with multiple bots (out of the original list
of 2,752). As a result the data contains accounts of
users who have been recorded to interact with only one
(of 50) bots (potentially multiple times). The exact
time of the first interaction is an essential part of the
data structure and will be used as an analysis tool in
what follows. Acknowledging that verified accounts are
somewhat different from an average member of Twitter
community, we have excluded all verified users from the
analysis.
All identified accounts were passed through
“Botometer” [32] in order to evaluate whether they
themselves exhibited bot-like behavior. In order to
make sure we analyzed the behavior of human twitter
users, all accounts where automation suspicion was
above 10% were disqualified.1 Another important
feature of sample selection was user location. As large
portion of the bot activity revolved around 2016 US
presidential elections we have decided to concentrate on
Twitter users who resided in the US only. We have used
1Botometer automation score distribution is bi-modal separating
highly likely humans from highly likely bots. Expanding automation
cut-off to 20% adds only about 3,000 additional users to the data set.
self-reported user locations for this purpose. This is the
best proxy available to us to make sure we are studying
a fairly homogeneous sample with respect to the subject
matter. Given that election campaigns have a strongly
state-specific flavor we only retained accounts where
the state of the user could be identified. This narrowed
down our sample to 54,106 twitter users. These users
are spread across all US states (and Washington DC).
Representation of states ranges from California, Texas
and New York accounting for 12.66%, 8.78% and
8.22% of users respectively to South Dakota, Wyoming
and Nevada with 0.12%, 0.11% and 0.07%. Distribution
of accounts across the bots is even more asymmetric.
58% of the users in our dataset have interacted with
one particularly powerful bot (@ten gop). The second
most popular bot (@crystal1johnson) accounts for only
7.43% of users. 37 or 50 bots each accounts for less
then one percent of users in our dataset.
Users interact with bots at varying intensity. About
69% of the users interacts with the corresponding bot
only once. On the extreme of the distribution, the dataset
also contains a user who is recorded interacting with
a bot 526 times. The average number of interactions
across all accounts is 2.21 (S.d.=5.72). Bot interaction
duration also varies across the users. This ranges from
0 (for users with one interaction) to interaction stretched
over the five year period. The mean interaction duration
is 20 days (S.d.=60).
Once the Twitter user has been retained for the
analysis, we have collected their Twitter timeline. This
includes all of their original tweets from the inception
of the account until December, 31 2020. Unfortunately
we are not able to collect information about content that
these users have been re-tweeting. Absence of re-tweets
constraints the analysis in this paper to the original
content generated by the users included in the study.
A typical twitter user in our dataset has has about 8.3
years of experience on the platform, and writes about
4.3 original tweets per day. In the timeline collection
process, we are able to recover each tweet’s content,
as well as its timestamp, number of likes, retweets and
comments it has received (as of December 31, 2020).
Using tweet content we are able to characterize these
tweets in multiple ways. We measure tweet’s length (in
terms of number of words), number of @s, number of
hashtags, number of images, number of links, etc. Data
contains over 702 million tweets.
In order to study the change in tweeting behavior
we need to choose the time unit. Given the size of
the dataset, we have chosen to study users’ monthly
behavior. We measure characteristics of each tweet, and
aggregate data on monthly level in order to describe
account’s behavior. Resulted panel data set includes
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Figure 1. Descriptive characteristics of the sample.
nearly over 5.4 million user-month observations.
Figure 1 plots a number of descriptive characteristics
of the data measured on monthly level. Panel A plots
the average number of tweets per user in our dataset
in the period of January 2013 through December 2017.
This shows stability in overall twitter behavior in the
sample with a slight (but sustained) increase in activity
around 2016 election period. The same panel also plots
the share of users who have had their first recorded
interaction happening in a given month. This curve
clearly shows the peak of bot activity in the US. Further
analysis of data shows that there is some seasonality
in twitter behavior. Namely, there are significant
differences in twitting activity across various months of
the year. This indicates that we need to take into account
this feature in order to precisely identify the effect of
interaction with a bot.
Panel B in Figure 1 visualizes how the number of
interactions with the bot are related to the duration of
the interaction. Not surprisingly we see that while two
interactions are usually spread across one month period,
8 interactions span over 3.5 months. This panel also
demonstrates that there is a significant difference across
the profiles of people who interact with bots at different
intensities. Namely people who interact with bots once
have (on average) had 55 months experience on twitter,
while people who interact with bots 10 times have only
43 months of experience (a year less) at the time when
they first interacted with the bot. This could mean that
younger people are more likely to interact with bots
over extended periods of time. It could, however, also
indicate that there is a significant amount of accounts
created on twitter with the purpose of interacting with
(known) bots (which would drive down the average
experience of the user who heavily interacts with the
bot). Nevertheless, this indicates that we need to control
for the user’s experience in our analysis.
4. Estimation method
The main statistical challenge in the process of
correctly estimating behavioral changes associated with
interaction with bots is identifying an appropriate
counterfactual to which target user behavior should be
compared. Matching (either exact, coarse exact, or
propensity score) across Twitter users is not feasible as
it requires collecting data on extensive part of Twitter
users who have not interacted with bots. Appropriate
methodology for identifying such users is not obvious.
An alternative way for estimating relevant effects is to
use only the data of bot-interacting (treated) individuals
and take advantage of the fact that they interact with bots
at different points in time. We use the latter approach.
Using the data set described in the previous section,
and given the fact that all important characteristics of
behavior are count variables, we estimate following
two (account-level fixed effects, panel) Poisson models.




+ βmmonth+ εi + εi,t,
where numTweetsi,t corresponds to the number of
Tweets by user i in month t and numInt measures
the number of interactions the user had with the bot
(throughout the whole Twitter activity period). It is
important to control for this variable as the difference in
interaction intensity might be an indication of inherent
differences across users (for example explicit intention
to interact with the automated agent). experience
measures the number of months since the account joined
Twitter. It is important to control for this feature as data
shows clear and steady increase in frequency of tweeting
with the increase in experience. month is an identifier
of the current month of the year and is intended to
control for yearly cycles in user behavior on Twitter (for
example, our data shows that users produce much more
tweets in January than in any other month of the year).
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Most importantly, B50 collects 50 dummy variables
identifying months in the focus period. Namely, these
collect the identifier of the month when i first interacted
with the bot, but also identifiers of each of 24 months
prior to first interaction interaction, 24 months following
the first interaction, and one common dummy for all
months after the period (i.e. beyond two years after
interaction). This allows us to estimate the profile of
behavior of a typical account.2
Once we have established the tweeting intensity
behavior of an account, we estimate a set of
characteristics per tweet within each month using
(2)
charTweeti,t = B50int+ numTweetsi,t
+ βinumInt+ βeexperience
+ βmmonth+ εi + εi,t.
Here, charTweeti,t would measure the total number
of words (in all tweets of user i in month t) in
order to measure the change in twitting style of the
user, total number of @s in order to measure user’s
willingness to engage with other users. This variable
could also measure the impact of user’s content. This
could be accomplished by measuring total number of
engagements with user’s content in a given month
(number of retweets, number of likes and number of
comments).
Given that all dependent variables are count
measures, and that we have a panel structure, we
estimate equations (1) and (2) using panel Poisson
estimator. Results presented in the following section are
based on these estimations and are reported along with
robust standard errors clustered on user level.
5. The effects of interacting with bots
Figure 2 presents results of estimations described
in the previous section. Here we focus on a four-year
period around the first recorded voluntary interaction
with the bot and describe the behavioral profile of users.
We plot results in terms of percentage change in our
variables of interest compared to the account’s behavior
in the period from the account’s inception to two years
prior the first interaction. The period prior to two
years before first interaction with the bot constitutes the
baseline and is used to set a typical behavioral profile for
a given user. Table 2 presents selected coefficients from
these estimations. In the table, estimates are presented
in the form of incidence rate ratios.
2We could also include bot-level, as well as state-level fixed effect
identifiers. However, given that we only have data on people who are
located within one state, and they interact with only one bot, account
level fixed effects estimator takes both of these into account.
Figure 2. Tweeting behavior in relation to the
interaction with the bot.
Notes: All values are calculated in relation to tweeting behavior
observed prior to two years before the first interaction with a bot.
Dashed lines delimit 95% confidence interval.
Three panels in figure 2 describe the temporal
behavior of number of tweets per month, as well as
number of words and number of @’s generated by the
typical user. Notice, that because numTweetsi,t is
included in equation (2), number of words and number
of references (i.e., @’s) measure averages per generated
tweet in a given month.
The results show significant alteration of tweeting
behavior by users during the time period around
the interaction with the confirmed social bot. This
behavior change is most prominent in terms of the
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Tweets Words @s Engagements
t-24 1.016 0.926 0.956 1.544
(0.55, 0.76) (0.04, 0.10) (0.10, 0.66) (0.25, 0.04)
t-12 0.972 0.941 0.791 1.409
(0.07, 0.70) (0.07, 0.44) (0.16, 0.26) (0.42, 0.25)
t-6 1.206 1.049 1.054 1.635
(0.10, 0.03) (0.09, 0.57) (0.14, 0.70) (0.06, 0.17)
t 3.067 2.048 2.128 3.875
(0.31, 0.00) (0.13, 0.00) (0.49, 0.00) (1.54, 0.00)
t+1 2.722 1.522 2.081 3.623
(0.28, 0.00) (0.10, 0.00) (0.33, 0.00) (1.59, 0.00)
t+2 2.304 1.457 1.812 3.546
(0.24, 0.00) (0.10, 0.00) (0.32, 0.00) (1.51, 0.01)
t+3 2.098 1.421 1.704 4.004
(0.22, 0.00) (0.10, 0.00) (0.30, 0.00) (1.92, 0.01)
t+6 1.697 1.275 1.563 4.324
(0.17, 0.00) (0.09, 0.00) (0.28, 0.00) (2.30, 0.01)
t+12 1.369 1.210 1.213 5.331
(0.15, 0.00) (0.10, 0.02) (0.24, 0.32) (3.72, 0.02)
t+18 1.164 1.042 1.225 5.023
(0.14, 0.19) (0.09, 0.42) (0.24, 0.29) (3.44, 0.02)
t+24 1.102 0.918 1.156 4.049
(0.14, 0.43) (0.08, 0.37) (0.29, 0.57) (3.11, 0.07)
Table 2. Selected coefficients from fixed effects
panel Poisson regressions.
Notes: Number of tweets is estimated using equation (1). Number of
words, @s and engagements is estimated using equation (2). Number
of engagements combines number of likes, retweets and replies.
Coefficients (ts) correspond to months, with t indicating the treatment
month. Coefficients are reported in terms of incidence rate ratios. In
brackets are presented (standard error, p-value)s.
tweeting frequency. Panel A of figure 1 indicates
that during the month when users first interact with
the bot they write 200% more tweets (tripling the
frequency) than in a baseline period. This increase
in frequency is statistically significant. In following
months tweeting frequency seems to drop gradually
and becomes statistically indistinguishable from the
behavior in the baseline period after 14 months from the
first interaction with the bot.
Panels B and C of the same graph demonstrate that
behavioral change does not concern only the frequency
of tweeting, but also the characteristics of the produced
original content. We see that during the month when
the account first interacted with the bot, length of
a typical tweet, in terms of the number of words,
doubles (a 100% increase over the baseline level).
Users also seem to use twice more @’s per tweet
than usual (during the baseline period), which is an
indication that accounts engage with more discussions
with other members of the platform. Similar to tweeting
frequency, these behavioral changes also dissipates over
the following 12 months (in fact, the increase in the
usage of @’s becomes statistically indistinguishable
from the pre-interaction/baseline period during the 8th
months after first interaction). Besides their statistical
significance, all these effects are economically very
large. Similar, but albeit less distinct patterns can be
noticed in the usage of hashtags, sharing of photos,
videos and URL’s by users who interact with identified
social bots.
One important characteristic of these results,
however, is that they do not seem to be “caused” by the
interaction with the account to a large extent. In fact, we
see the uptick in all variable profiles starting from about
six months before the recorded interaction. There could
be two reasons for this. Firstly, users start being exposed
to content generated/diffused by bots before they engage
in the discussion with them and this prompts them to
change their behavior. Alternatively, it might be that
(for some reason) users start participating in discussion
on social networks and within about six months they end
up interacting with the automated agent. Unfortunately
our data does not allow to distinguish between these two
explanations. However, we can exclude the possibility
that these patterns are driven by the latter mechanism, as
in this case observing pronounced peaks during months
of first interaction in all three panels of Figure 2 would
be extremely unlikely.3
All three characteristics reported in Figure 2 describe
the behavior of the user. However, one can also ask if
engaging with a social bot, and thus, with its ecosystem
would also alter performance of the original content
generated by the users. To answer this question we
model engagement with user’s content using equation
(2). Engagement measure adds likes, comments and
retweets of all original posts by the user in a given
month. Estimates of the change in this characteristic
are presented on Figure 3. These results point to the
fact that tweets by users during the month of interaction
with bots enjoy four times higher engagement than
usual. Similarly, the engagement seems to be more
persistent than behavioral changes in Figure 2 – increase
in engagement remains significant over 18 months
following the first interaction with the bot. Unlike
behavioral measures, the peak in engagement arrives a
year after initial interaction with the bot. The uptick
also starts later – only three months before the first
recorded interaction. At the same time, estimates for
engagement measures seem to be less precise than those
for behavioral measures as indicated by a wide margin
3Recall that first bot interaction months of great majority of our
users are spread around at least a 14-months period from February
2016 to March 2017.
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Figure 3. Engagement with user’s content.
Notes: Values are calculated in relation to tweeting behavior observed
prior to two years before the first interaction with a bot. Dashed
lines delimit 95% confidence interval. Given that upper limit of the
confidence interval is irrelevant for the positive effect, the plot was
scaled to highlight the profile of the estimate itself.
around estimates.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed behavioral changes
associated with the interaction with automated bot on
Twitter. Our results indicate significant changes in
human Twitter users’ behavior. Around the time period
when user interacts with a bot we see a strong take off in
frequency of posting. In addition, we see statistically
and economically significant qualitative changes that
accompany this quantitative break. We see users writing
longer posts, we also see them engaging closer with the
community by a heavier use of @s, hashtags, images
and URLs.
As an important caveat, it is worthy to note that our
study has no sure way to measure exact share of this
change that is attributable to the interaction with the
exposure to information coming from bots. The reason
for this is that even though we have information on when
a given user has explicitly engaged in a discussion with
a bot, there is no way of identifying the exact point
in time when they first got exposed to the information
coming from the bot. It is possible, in fact plausible,
that information peddled by the bot has been present on
user’s Twitter wall quite some time before they decided
to react to it by Tweeting at, or replying to, the bot.
This, in fact could be an explanation for the pattern
of all measured effects starting to break from baseline
predictions about six month prior to official interaction
with the bot.
Increase in tweeting frequency and engagement
with the community as a result of interacting with an
entity diffusing controversial information is somewhat
surprising. It goes against the well-known spiral of
silence theory [33] which argues that such interaction
would result in decrease in the incentive to express one’s
opinion [34, 35]. However, it is important to notice
that in this respect our data might suffer from selection
bias. We identify study subjects by the very fact that
they engage in the discussion with the bot. People who
might suffer from spiral of silence, however, will most
likely not interact with the bot (choosing silence). As a
result a large portion of users who are exposed to bot’s
influence but choose to abstain from interacting with
them are missing from our study. One way to closely
examine this possibility would be to extend the study
to include the tweet sentiment analysis. Given that we
have access to complete tweet content and can establish
the baseline for each user’s tweet sentiment, it would
be interesting to examine potential breaks in this feature
around the bot interaction period. This would also allow
us to closely evaluate the emotional contagion effects of
bots [7]. This very task of sentiment analysis of our 702
million tweets, indeed, constitutes the first step of our
future research.
Another worthy step is the additional data collection
effort in order to establish a comparable set of twitter
users who have never interacted with any of the
identified bots. Such complementary dataset will allow
us to set up a more credible baseline for precisely
estimating the extent of behavioral change associated
with the interaction with the bot.
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